سینا قبادی اسکی

in general, this study aims to evaluate the relationship between strategic deviance and auditor quality, as well as the consequences of choosing high quality auditors in companies with strategic deviance at the level of all companies admitted to the Tehran Stock Exchange, and to provide a model to explain this relationship.

In terms of the purpose of the implementation, the present research is a descriptive research, in terms of the logic of the implementation, a deductive-inductive research, from the perspective of the implementation process, a quantitative research, from the perspective of the result of the implementation, a fundamental research, and in terms of the time dimension, It is a longitudinal research (post-event) and in terms of the implementation method, it is in the field of correlational research. In order to test the hypotheses of the research, ۱۳۴ companies were selected between ۲۰۱۲ and ۲۰۱۹ based on the consolidated/combined data of the test and statistical analysis using EViews software.

Companies with high levels of strategic deviance have chosen quality auditors due to the high level of agency conflict, the limitation of earning management and the reduction of the company's capital cost. On the other hand, in companies with strategic deviance, the selection of quality auditors has led to limiting the amount of earning management and reducing the company's capital cost. And employing and selecting quality auditors has not been effective in limiting capital accumulation in the hands of major shareholders and increasing market value, especially in companies with high levels of strategic deviance.